Repeatedly, formal standardisation has been criticised for issuing standards that are not up-to-date and difficult to implement. The institutional set-up is blamed. This chapter examines the claim and explores how different standards settings affect technology development. An institutional analysis is made.
INTRODUCTION
The effect of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) on our daily life needs no explanation. That standardisation reduces diversity, facilitates interoperability and thus plays an important role in diffusing ICT uses is clear. Standardisation matters to the ICT market. Less evident is the way in which standardisation influences the kind of ICTs that become available to customers. In the past it was common to view committee standardisation as a locus for collective learning and exchange of technological knowledge.
New standards were expected to embody state-of-the art ideas on technology. But practitioners, i.e. ICT standards developers and implementers, as well as standardisation watchers repeatedly voice disappointment about the technical content of new standards and the process of committee standardisation. They criticise the formal standards bodies for furthering a politicised mode of standardisation, and point to the greater use of standards that stem from other arena (e.g. consortia, user groups, and practitioner organisations). These other institutional settings of standardisation are held to produce more applicable standards and standards of better quality technology-wise. Are they barking up the wrong tree? In this chapter I explore whether this is the case.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Several studies on standardisation have examined the impact of standardisation on ICT development (e.g. Hanseth et al. 1996 , Schmidt & Werle, 1998 . They use Social Shaping of Technology theories to do so (e.g. Bijker, 1990; Callon, 1986; Hughes, 1987) . In these studies the standards setting environment is -implicitly or explicitly -treated as a setting of technology development. Standardisation is an endogenous factor in technology development (Egyedi, 1996) . It is a means to co-ordinate technology development (Schmidt & Werle, 1998) . However, it proves to be difficult to pinpoint the impact which standardisation has (e.g. does it hamper flexibility in technology development; Hanseth et al. 1996) . One reason is that its effect depends on the maturity of the technology concerned. In the classic approach to technology development three successive phases are distinguished (Cramer & Schot, 1990) . The phase of (1) invention covers all activities from the generation of an idea to the development of the new process or product. If successfully marketed the invention becomes an (2) innovation. The last phase is that of (3) diffusion of the innovation in the market. This distinction has been refined and criticised for several reasons 1 . For the argument in this section, it suffices to distinguish between emergent and mature technologies. In the field of standardisation the issue of technological maturity has been used to sketch the dilemma of when to standardise. Early standardisation, practitioners say, forestalls diversity but precludes experience with the alternatives, while late standardisation makes it more difficult to reach consensus.
To complicate matters, in standardisation too different stages are being discerned (Cargill, 1989; Mansell & Hawkins, 1992 In order to narrow down the issue, only certain phases in standardisation and technology development are of immediate relevance for the criticism addressed in this chapter.
Usually the discussions about the pro's and con's of standardisation start out from the assumption that standardisation deals with emergent technologies, and that the negotiation stage is the most influential stage of standardisation. (I will review these assumptions in section 6.) The negotiations take place within an institutional context. The context of formal standardisation is held to be accountable for the lack of innovative and applicable standards.
Rommetveit shows that moving a decision process from one arena to another with different structural features changes its outcome. 2 Analogously, several studies argue that the institutional context of standards committees is highly relevant to the outcome of the standards process (Genschel, 1993, p.26; Bonino & Spring, 1991, p.102 (Egyedi, 1993) . Once ideas are institutionalised, they acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are not easily dismissed or changed (e.g. March & Olsen, 1989, p.52) . The institutionalised ideology of, for example, the formal standards bodies, thus fosters continuity in the standardisation approach. It indicates the role, which the formal standards bodies aim to play, and clarifies the direction in which institutional provisions influence current standards work. Standards procedures regulate the committee process. Rules are laid down on how the negotiation of insights and interests should proceed. The raison d' être of formal standardisation is that the standards resulting from this negotiation process will in many cases be different from the way they would have been without the regulatory role of standards bodies. The force field of vested interests and technology-related standpoints is transformed. The standardisation structure and procedures direct the transformation process. As the rules of a game affect its outcome, provisions for formal standardisation affect standards.
In the next sections, I examine the standardisation ideology of the formal international standards bodies, the role they aim for (section 3), and the procedural adaptations that have taken place in reaction to pressure from European developments and 'competing' standards arenas (section 4). I compare formal standardisation with other forms of standardisation in section 5, and close off by re-addressing the criticism voiced by practitioners (section 6). and IEC have a many-staged process (see Table 1 ). For more details on organisational structures and procedures, I refer to Egyedi (1996) . 
FORMAL STANDARDISATION

Project stage Associated document
Name
1.
The consensus principle is adhered to in the most essential stages of decision making, such as the preparatory and committee stage in the ISO/IEC and the approval process in the ITU-T.
2.
They stand to the voluntary application of standards 4 , which is why the ITU speaks of recommendations instead of standards.
3.
There is concern for the quality of standards 5 , an element relevant in all three standards bodies.
4.
Participation is based on national membership (national standards bodies) and not on direct membership of interest parties and companies 6 . ITU's membership of national administrations is similarly nationally oriented.
5.
ISO/IEC strive for a broad constituency of national delegations 7 .
6. They adhere to democratic working methods by means of a "well-balanced influence of national members" in management bodies of international standardisation organisations and an "open, democratic process of decisionmaking" 8 . Democratic ideals are also evident in the ITU procedures.
7.
All three bodies strive for an impartial, politically and financially independent organisation and procedures 9 .
8.
All three bodies strive for widely used and thus in principle international standards 10 .
9. ISO/IEC procedures are designed to promote fair competition and fair trade 11 .
10. ISO/IEC strive for openness in information 12 .
11. All three bodies strive for rational, technical discussion.
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In the past, the ITU ideology differed in some respects from that of the ISO and the IEC.
Irmer (1992) speaks of the 'closed circles' of the Study Groups. The ITU largely excluded competitive service providers. It did not aim at fair competition and fair trade (9) . There was no 'broad constituency of national delegations' (5) or openness in information (10) . Changes have been underway. The ITU is moving towards more openness and fair competition.
Ideological rationale. The set of ideological features reflects a form of argumentation.
The rationale is that international standards cannot be imposed. If they are to be voluntarily applied, potential implementers need to be convinced that the standards have wide support. The ITU rallies support by way of international consensus. ISO/IEC fosters support by taking care that all interest groups have the possibility to state their requirements and influence the standards process. The spectrum of interests is represented by broadly constituted national delegations, according to the rationale.
Consensus decision-making ensures that the utmost will be done to accommodate minority standpoints. Democratic and impartial working procedures heighten the acceptability of the standards. The measures serve to maximise the likelihood that formal standards will be preferred to proprietary standards and will be widely implemented 14 .
The rationale underlying the standards system is that a democratic approach is the most robust approach. The ideology could be called a democratic ideology.
Friction between ideology and praxis. In practice, certain ideological objectives pose a problem. In the decision fora of the ITU there is a "heavy layer of international politics" (Rutkowski, 1991, p.292; Raymond, 1990) . The vulnerability of democratic and impartial procedures (7) is capitalised on to further political interests. At stake are institutionally sanctioned strategies. Conflicting interests between economic regions and between the developing and the industrial countries politicise the standards process. In the ISO and the IEC the 'broad constituency of national delegations' (5) is difficult to realise. The composition of technical committees is more homogeneous than the ideological feature indicates. National delegations most often consist of industrial interest groups.
Process or Outcome?
Extrapolating, is the role of formal standards bodies to regulate the process or to produce standards? Standardisation theory provides few clues on the matter. Turning to institutional theory, March & Olsen (1989, p.49 ) address this question with regard to political institutions. They question the primacy of action and outcomes. The core task of political institutions is to confirm the legitimacy of decisions. Legitimacy is furthered by demonstrating that intelligent intentional choices are made, by securing that relevant people are involved and by an appropriate control structure (March & Olsen, .
The same elements are evident in the standardisation ideology. They define the role of formal standards bodies as guardians of the process. Standardisation procedures serve to legitimise the process. 15 They are designed to regulate the process in a way that most participants will benefit from the result. As such, they interpose a democratic layer between the field of forces and the standard. The interregional alliances posed more of a threat. The threat was dealt with in different ways. After some initial alarm, the interregional group on telecommunications, for example, was enrolled as a feeder-platform.
Fourthly, in the late 1980s increasingly multi-party standards from other sources than the formal international standards bodies were being used -notably Internet standards. The formal bodies devised ways to formalise these grey standards.
Box 1: Institutional Concerns in International Standardisation
• Integration of telecommunications (ITU) & information technology (ISO/IEC JTC1) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) • Threat of 'Fortress Europe' and European standards (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) • Rise of interregional networks on standardisation (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) • Increasing significance of grey standards (1987-....) In particular the pressure from Europe and from grey standards bodies forced the formal bodies to rethink their role in international standardisation. Both forces drew attention to a specific problem. The 'Europe 1992' schedule centralised the problem of timely standardisation, while the activities of grey standards bodies drew attention to the problem of implementing formal standards.
Eurocentrism
In • ETSI's membership rules and working methods were contemplated as possible alternatives. Some ideas were adopted, such as the use of project teams . A proposal for non-national membership in the ITU (e.g. was turned down by the Plenipotentiary.
• The international bodies went out of their way to accommodate ETSI in their policy
documents (e.g. in the ISO/IEC Code for Good Practice for Standardisation) 16 .
• European Directives influenced the international agenda and time-schedule. (1989/1991) . The agreements served as models for future agreements with other regions. (IEC, 1992, pp.13-14) The European interests were well cared for. A form of Eurocentrism was at stake, driven by (see Figure 1 ):
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• The conditional nature of European co-operation with international standards bodies was accepted in the co-operation agreements concerning common planning of new work and parallel voting
• the Commission's Directives and mandates, which affected European and international time-schedules and priorities in standardisation (3, 6) ;
• ETSI and the exemplary function of its procedures. Its influence extended to other sectors within Europe (4), to the international standards arena (6) and -via interregional activity -to international telecommunications (5); and
• CEN and CENELEC's co-operation agreements with their international counterparts, which took on an exemplary status (7). (2) the role of the CEPT therein. The Commission's requirements and ETSI's example affected both CEN and CENELEC's workings (4), and those of the international standards bodies (5, 6) . Thus, the European actors to a large extent shaped developments in the international standards network up to 1993 by communicating a sense the urgency 19 .
Grey Standardisation
A second influential source of change in the international standardisation is grey standardisation, a term first used by Bruins (1993) . It became a force to be reckoned with consortia is still growing. 20 It appears to be a phenomenon which is characteristic for the field of ICT. I can think of two main reasons why ICT competitors presently co-operate on a larger scale. Firstly, the field is characterised by multiple players in a growing market. In other words, the good fortune of one player need not occur at the expense of other players.
Secondly, compatibility is a (saleable) feature of ICT products and services, and is generally also a prerequisite for new facilities and services. Both motivations for co-operation gain force in market that has started to crystallise.
Grey standards fora vary in their appreciation of close ties with the official standardisation circuit. Some opt for co-operation agreements. In general, co-operation involves drafting grey standards and submitting them for formalisation to international bodies via national or regional channels. In the past, the IEEE and the European Computer Some of its members also participate in the formal process.
Shifts in Formal Standardisation
The role that the formal standards bodies play, although proven to be rather stable, has also shown to be susceptible to outside pressure. The previous section indicates that a shift in emphasis has taken place from 'pure standards development' to the inclusion of 'formalisation of external standards'; the 'democratic ideals' have been slightly adapted to cater to economic demands for timely standards; and through co-operation agreements the rules for national participation have been circumvented in order to include contributions from regional alliances, social networks (e.g. Internet Society), and formal regional standards bodies. Table 2 summarises these shifts in emphasis and extrapolates a number of them, based on the pressure for change voiced by participants in formal standardisation and my expectation that the 'competition' from grey standardisation keeps up. I expect that the formal bodies will ultimately widen their scope and include provisions and procedures for implementation-oriented activities, because the use and implementation of formal standards is a recurrent problem. I further expect that the emphasis in formal standardisation will shift from addressing potential interest groups to addressing potential contributors as participants in the process. in multi-party use of standards and in control of the market, respectively. A last main difference between the three styles of standardisation is their concern with implementation-independent standards. The formal standards bodies strive for standards that do not favour certain companies (i.e. highly implementation-independent solutions).
In contrast, de facto standards are set in an application environment, and are thus inherently implementation-dependent. The standpoints of grey standardisation groups vary greatly on this issue. The consortia will generally favour implementationindependent solutions in order to create equal chances. Internet standardisation, on the other hand, addresses a specific implementation environment. Compatibly among
Internet standards requires implementation-dependent solutions. The varying degree of implementation-independence implies a different degree of constriction on technology development. The higher the degree of implementation-independence, the less constrictive. See Table 3 . Table 3 : Characteristics of three styles of standardisation.
An important problem in generalising about the nature of the standardisation -technology relationship, even when we restrict ourselves to the field of ICT, is that the role of standardisation is continuously being redefined. For example, whereas the most common form of standardisation used to be variety reduction ex post, in the late 1970's and 1980's it was ex ante standardisation which attracted the attention of standardisers.
Standardisation in an early phase of technological maturity was seen to be a more effective way to achieve interoperability. It was expected to prevent incompatibility.
Since then attention has shifted to acceleration of the process and ways to deal with multiparty de facto standards such as Internet standards. Reinterpreting these changes of meaning in terms of interoperability, the problem of interoperability is successively solved through reducing diversity, preventing diversity and selectively sanctioning diversity in combination with initiating multi-protocol standardisation. These solutions embed different views on the role of standardisation.
Most economic studies treat standardisation as an endogenous factor in market development (e.g. David & Greenstein, 1990) . Standards mediate the market. This is most evident for assembled and interworking products. The required compatibility standards are points of reference for interdependent market participants. The above noted forms of standardisation, that is ex post standardisation, implementation independent ex ante standardisation, and implementation-oriented grey and de facto standardisation, affect the market differently. Standardisation activities retrospectively structure the market, accompany preparatory market activity and propel market activity respectively.
DISCUSSION
Those who criticise the formal standards bodies for not delivering innovative and usable ICT standards, are they barking up the wrong tree? An institutional analysis of the standards procedures gives insight into the likely character of negotiation processes (e.g. political consensus in a technical jacket) and hints at the standards that are likely to evolve (e.g. compromises and multiple options) and the ensuing standards implementations (e.g. partial implementations). But, specific effects of institutional procedures on standards outcomes and ensuing technologies are hard to identify. For, the institutional analysis also shows that the role these bodies aim to play is foremost a process-oriented one. Expectations in respect to formal standardisation should therefore foremost be directed towards standards process characteristics and not towards standards outcomes. The problem is, of course, that process and outcome are related. The ideological rationale that underlies institutional provisions is that democratic and impartial working procedures maximise the likelihood that formal standards will be widely implemented. If wide implementation does not occur, one could conclude that the rationale does not work for the field of ICT. For the moment such a conclusion would be unjustified. In rapidly evolving areas such as, for example, mobile telecommunications the formal standards bodies offer an important platform for consensus building. Those who wish to draw an unfavourable comparison between the formal and the grey standards bodies must remember that the latter are 'one issue' bodies, are less concerned with producing implementation-independent standards, and are not burdened with heavily process-oriented aims.
Institutional criticism is usually based on the assumptions, that standardisation foremost addresses emergent technologies; that the objective is to produce standards with new technical content; and that the most important stage of standardisation is the negotiation stage. With regard to the first two assumptions, past accounts overemphasise the inventive quality of technical contributions. The input of technology suppliers in the formal standards process is not likely to contain true novelty. At stake are premature innovations (i.e. not inventions in the classic sense). These are past the stage of the drawing board but may not yet have a market. I hold that in such cases the standards environment should be viewed as an arena in which the co-ordination of technology diffusion is being prepared. It should be judged on whether it takes the width of the field into account (i.e. in line with the current, foremost process-oriented aim of formal standardisation). In other cases, where innovations are at an early stage of market development, the standards process should be judged on whether standards are implementable and usable, that is, on the standards outcome. The need for such a twofold assessment is a consequence of my view that nowadays committee work foremost aims at creating a common platform of (minimum) requirements for the diffusion of standards uses -and thereby for the diffusion of technologies. The role of formal standards bodies may thus need to be reassessed in terms of its role in co-ordinating technology diffusion. The emphasis would then lie on standardisation as an ex ante market mechanism -and not on standardisation as a setting of technological innovation.
